Commentary for Bava Metzia 6:6
מה לפיו שכן מחייבו קרבן תאמר בעדים שאין מחייבין אותו קרבן
while the evidence of witnesses does not oblige him to bring an offering?<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' If he contradicts the evidence. For it appears from Lev. IV, 28, that it is only his own admission of the wrong he has committed unawares that necessitates the bringing of an offering by him, but not the information given by witnesses. If this is so, then how does it follow that witnesses make it necessary for him to take an oath? ');"><sup>6</sup></span>
Tosafot on Bava Metzia
What [can you prove from the admission] of his [own] mouth, which [has the strength to] obligate him [to bring] a karban? Can the same be said for witnesses etc. [who do not have the power to obligate him to bring a karban]? At this point in the dialogue of the Gemara, the Gemara is using one’s mouth - his admission - as the basis of a kal v’chomer. His admission does not have the strength to obligate him to pay penalties, and even so it obligates him to swear when he admits that he owes fifty of the one hundred zuz the plaintiff is claiming. Certainly, the testimony of witnesses which is strong enough to obligate him to pay penalties, should also have the strength to require him to swear when that testimony says that he owes fifty of the hundred zuz that the plaintiff is claiming.
Penalties
His admission: No
Witnesses: Yes
Oath
His admission: Yes
Witnesses: Certainly
As we explained in the previous Tosfos, a kal v’chomer is subject to a ‘פירכא - challenge’. The nature of the challenge is to show that one’s mouth, which is being described as the ‘קל - lenient’ is actually more powerful in certain cases. Presently, the Gemara argues that one’s mouth is more powerful than the testimony of witnesses, because his admission can obligate him to bring a karban. Presumably, the logical conclusion of this sentence is, but witnesses cannot obligate him to offer a karban.
Tosfos will explain the exact conditions where one’s admission is more powerful than the testimony of witnesses in regard to offering a karban. When the Gemara says that one’s admission obligates him to offer a karban, the meaning is: That his admission obligates him to offer a karban even when witnesses contradict him and say: What you ate was not cheilev,1Cheilev refers to the fats of the animal that are prohibited by the pain of kares. but shuman.2Shuman refers to other fatty parts of the animal that are permitted for consumption. In this case, his admission wins and he is obligated to offer a karban, even though witnesses testify that he is not required to offer a karban.
Perhaps the Gemara is speaking of one’s admission that he is liable to offer a karban when it is not contradicted by witnesses? For if the witnesses are not contradicting him, how can [the Gemara] say: Can you say the same for witnesses etc. who do not obligate him to bring a karban?]. But if we are discussing one’s admission when it is not contradicted by witnesses,it is simply not true that witness’ testimony would not obligate a karban in a comparable situation. The reality is that witnesses also obligate him to bring a karban, if he does not contradict them.
For even a single witness, if not contradicted, obligates him to bring a karban. When not contradicted, an admission, testimony of witnesses and even a single witness are all equal as far as obligating him to offer a karban. The special strength of an admission must be that even if it is contradicted by witnesses, it still obligates him to offer a karban.
In order to understand this Tosfos properly we must learn a Gemara in Kereisos 12a that discusses the reason why one’s own admission stands even against the testimony of witnesses. The Gemara there is discussing the Mishna in Kereisos 11b, soon to be quoted in our Gemara about a dispute between R’ Meir and the Rabanan. R’ Meir holds that if two witnesses testify that a person ate cheilev he must offer a karban. The Rabanan say the he is exempt. The Gemara there asks: What is the reason of the Rabanan? Is it because a person is believed about himself more than a hundred people, since this is something that affects only himself, he is the ultimate authority about his own obligations?
Or perhaps it is because we say there is a migo, that he could have said “I ate the cheilev intentionally”. It is beyond the witnesses to know whether he ate the cheilev intentionally or inadvertently. Thus, if he would insist that he ate it intentionally, we would necessarily believe him. So too, when he says: I did not eat cheilev at all, he is believed and is exempt from bringing a karban.
We see that there are two possible explanations of the Rabanan’s opinion:
a) A person is believed about his own private affairs even to the exclusion of witnesses.
b) We believe him because he could have exempted himself by saying: I ate the cheilev intentionally.
Which of these two versions in Kereisos 12a is compatible with our Gemara in Bava Metzia 3b?
This passage holds like the version in Perek Amru Lo (Kereisos 12a) that explains the reason of the Rabanan soon quoted later, that when [witnesses] said to him: You ate cheilev and he says I did not eat cheilev, that he is exempt from offering a karban, because a person is believed about himself more than a hundred people. Therefore, his mouth obligates him to offer a karban even if witnesses contradict him3See אוצר מפרשי התלמוד who quotes many commentators who explain Tosfos’ position in this issue. We must keep in mind that when a person claims that he ate cheilev and witnesses contradict him, he may be believed as far as himself is concerned. In reality however, there are other people affected by this question. Consider the Kohanim who need to offer this sacrifice. It is true that the supposed perpetrator insists that he is obligated to offer this karban, but there are a pair of kosher witnesses who say that there is no obligation to offer this karban and it is actually an ordinary animal that is not a karban at all. So too, as far as eating the flesh of this karban, the witnesses are saying that it is forbidden to do so, because this is חולין שנשחטו בעזרה - an ordinary animal that was slaughtered in the temple, which may not be eaten. It is beyond the scope of this work to deal with all these issues. because a person is the ultimate authority about himself. However, by the same token witnesses do not obligate him to offer a karban, if he contradicts their testimony.
Why is our Gemara not compatible with approach b) mentioned in Kereisos 12a? For according to the other version, that explains the reason of the Rabanan that we believe the person who says: I did not eat cheilev by adjusting his statement and explaining his words as follows: I did not eat cheilev inadvertently which would make me liable for a karban, rather, I did so intentionally and I am exempt from a karban.4See רמב"ם שגגות פ'א ה'א who rules in favor of this opinion.
This version b) of the explanation of the Rabanan must be logical. Tosfos adds something to the simple meaning of that Gemara: It must be speaking of when at the time he said “I did not eat cheilev” we did not interrogate him about what he meant. Since we do not have a clear statement that he did not eat cheilev at all, we can say that initially he meant that he did not eat cheilev inadvertently, but intentionally and he is therefore exempt from a karban. However, he is not believed to directly contradict the witnesses. If he should say that he did not eat cheilev at all and the witnesses testify that he did eat cheilev inadvertently, we would not believe him and he would have to bring a karban.
If so, the testimony of witnesses is more powerful than his mouth, for they can obligate him to offer a karban even when he contradicts them, and he cannot obligate himself to offer a karban, if [witnesses] were contradicting him.
According to this version in the Gemara in Kereisos, R’ Chiya’s position that the testimony of witnesses is stronger than one’s own admission comes out even according to the Rabanan. Our Gemara did not need to say that R’ Chiya follows R’ Meir who disagrees with the Rabanan.
Penalties
His admission: No
Witnesses: Yes
Oath
His admission: Yes
Witnesses: Certainly
As we explained in the previous Tosfos, a kal v’chomer is subject to a ‘פירכא - challenge’. The nature of the challenge is to show that one’s mouth, which is being described as the ‘קל - lenient’ is actually more powerful in certain cases. Presently, the Gemara argues that one’s mouth is more powerful than the testimony of witnesses, because his admission can obligate him to bring a karban. Presumably, the logical conclusion of this sentence is, but witnesses cannot obligate him to offer a karban.
Tosfos will explain the exact conditions where one’s admission is more powerful than the testimony of witnesses in regard to offering a karban. When the Gemara says that one’s admission obligates him to offer a karban, the meaning is: That his admission obligates him to offer a karban even when witnesses contradict him and say: What you ate was not cheilev,1Cheilev refers to the fats of the animal that are prohibited by the pain of kares. but shuman.2Shuman refers to other fatty parts of the animal that are permitted for consumption. In this case, his admission wins and he is obligated to offer a karban, even though witnesses testify that he is not required to offer a karban.
Perhaps the Gemara is speaking of one’s admission that he is liable to offer a karban when it is not contradicted by witnesses? For if the witnesses are not contradicting him, how can [the Gemara] say: Can you say the same for witnesses etc. who do not obligate him to bring a karban?]. But if we are discussing one’s admission when it is not contradicted by witnesses,it is simply not true that witness’ testimony would not obligate a karban in a comparable situation. The reality is that witnesses also obligate him to bring a karban, if he does not contradict them.
For even a single witness, if not contradicted, obligates him to bring a karban. When not contradicted, an admission, testimony of witnesses and even a single witness are all equal as far as obligating him to offer a karban. The special strength of an admission must be that even if it is contradicted by witnesses, it still obligates him to offer a karban.
In order to understand this Tosfos properly we must learn a Gemara in Kereisos 12a that discusses the reason why one’s own admission stands even against the testimony of witnesses. The Gemara there is discussing the Mishna in Kereisos 11b, soon to be quoted in our Gemara about a dispute between R’ Meir and the Rabanan. R’ Meir holds that if two witnesses testify that a person ate cheilev he must offer a karban. The Rabanan say the he is exempt. The Gemara there asks: What is the reason of the Rabanan? Is it because a person is believed about himself more than a hundred people, since this is something that affects only himself, he is the ultimate authority about his own obligations?
Or perhaps it is because we say there is a migo, that he could have said “I ate the cheilev intentionally”. It is beyond the witnesses to know whether he ate the cheilev intentionally or inadvertently. Thus, if he would insist that he ate it intentionally, we would necessarily believe him. So too, when he says: I did not eat cheilev at all, he is believed and is exempt from bringing a karban.
We see that there are two possible explanations of the Rabanan’s opinion:
a) A person is believed about his own private affairs even to the exclusion of witnesses.
b) We believe him because he could have exempted himself by saying: I ate the cheilev intentionally.
Which of these two versions in Kereisos 12a is compatible with our Gemara in Bava Metzia 3b?
This passage holds like the version in Perek Amru Lo (Kereisos 12a) that explains the reason of the Rabanan soon quoted later, that when [witnesses] said to him: You ate cheilev and he says I did not eat cheilev, that he is exempt from offering a karban, because a person is believed about himself more than a hundred people. Therefore, his mouth obligates him to offer a karban even if witnesses contradict him3See אוצר מפרשי התלמוד who quotes many commentators who explain Tosfos’ position in this issue. We must keep in mind that when a person claims that he ate cheilev and witnesses contradict him, he may be believed as far as himself is concerned. In reality however, there are other people affected by this question. Consider the Kohanim who need to offer this sacrifice. It is true that the supposed perpetrator insists that he is obligated to offer this karban, but there are a pair of kosher witnesses who say that there is no obligation to offer this karban and it is actually an ordinary animal that is not a karban at all. So too, as far as eating the flesh of this karban, the witnesses are saying that it is forbidden to do so, because this is חולין שנשחטו בעזרה - an ordinary animal that was slaughtered in the temple, which may not be eaten. It is beyond the scope of this work to deal with all these issues. because a person is the ultimate authority about himself. However, by the same token witnesses do not obligate him to offer a karban, if he contradicts their testimony.
Why is our Gemara not compatible with approach b) mentioned in Kereisos 12a? For according to the other version, that explains the reason of the Rabanan that we believe the person who says: I did not eat cheilev by adjusting his statement and explaining his words as follows: I did not eat cheilev inadvertently which would make me liable for a karban, rather, I did so intentionally and I am exempt from a karban.4See רמב"ם שגגות פ'א ה'א who rules in favor of this opinion.
This version b) of the explanation of the Rabanan must be logical. Tosfos adds something to the simple meaning of that Gemara: It must be speaking of when at the time he said “I did not eat cheilev” we did not interrogate him about what he meant. Since we do not have a clear statement that he did not eat cheilev at all, we can say that initially he meant that he did not eat cheilev inadvertently, but intentionally and he is therefore exempt from a karban. However, he is not believed to directly contradict the witnesses. If he should say that he did not eat cheilev at all and the witnesses testify that he did eat cheilev inadvertently, we would not believe him and he would have to bring a karban.
If so, the testimony of witnesses is more powerful than his mouth, for they can obligate him to offer a karban even when he contradicts them, and he cannot obligate himself to offer a karban, if [witnesses] were contradicting him.
According to this version in the Gemara in Kereisos, R’ Chiya’s position that the testimony of witnesses is stronger than one’s own admission comes out even according to the Rabanan. Our Gemara did not need to say that R’ Chiya follows R’ Meir who disagrees with the Rabanan.
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